A dialogue between a foreign philosopher and a powerful statesman outline Plato's reflections on the family, the status of women, property rights, and criminal law.

An English translation of an historically oriented inquiry into Epicurean thought concerning religion. The theme of ataraxia and its consistency with a belief in the existence of the gods is developed in relation to Epicurus' thought concerning friendship, religion, and the Stoic doctrine which grew out of Plato's Timaeus.--J. E. B.

Wind makes abundant references to such classical philosophers as Plato, Plotinus, and Seneca in his elucidation of Renaissance works of art in terms of pagan myths and rites. His study is scholarly and full and is well illustrated with excellent plates.--F. E. B.

Plato is one of the key ancient authors studied by both classicists and philosophers. This long-awaited new edition contains seven of the dialogues of Plato, and is the first in the five-volume complete edition of his works in the Oxford Classical Texts series. The result of many years of painstaking scholarship, the new volume will replace the now nearly 100 year old original edition, and is destined to become just as long-lasting a classic.

This long-awaited new edition contains eight of the dialogues of Plato, and is the first in a new five-volume complete edition of his works in the OCT series.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Prima Facie Duty to Obey: A Brief History Implications of Catechistic Metaethics for the Duty of Obedience Implications of Commonalist Metaethics for the Duty of Obedience Conclusion References.

I argue that, in the Prior Analytics, higher and above the well-known ‘reduction through impossibility’ of figures, Aristotle is resorting to a general procedure of demonstrating through impossibility in various contexts. This is shown from the analysis of the role of adunaton in conversions of premises and other demonstrations where modal or truth-value consistency is indirectly shown to be valid through impossibility. Following the meaning of impossible as ‘non-existent’, the system is also completed by rejecting any invalid combinations of terms (...) in deductions or conversions. The notion of impossibility reaches the core of Aristotle's system in the Prior Analytics. On the one hand, the use of adunaton shows that he is following one of the two requisites for demonstrative science formulated in the Posterior Analytics, i.e. to demonstrate that it is impossible for things to be otherwise than stated. On the other hand, that demonstrations through impossibility are rooted in the notion of contradiction supp.. (shrink)

E.R. Dodds’ 1959 edition of Plato’s Gorgias is a conventional treatment of this dialogue, aimed at audiences interested in close study of the text. Dodds himself regretted this outcome. He felt he had lost sight of an earlier goal, formulated at a time of political turmoil on the eve of WorldWar II, of using the Gorgias to bring out ‘both the resemblance and the difference between Plato’s situation and that of the intellectual today’. The present paper attempts to (...) reconstruct that goal, as it survives residually in his edition, surfaces in his The Greeks and the Irrational, and appears in some writings from the 1930s, particularly in unpublished lectures. Dodds did frequently juxtapose ancient and modern conceptions of the intellectual, and in a way that cast Plato in a positive light, as someone politically engaged and self-critical, and acutely sensitive, as Dodds himself was, to the political implications of social psychology. (shrink)

E.R. Dodds’ 1959 edition of Plato’s Gorgias is a conventional treatment of this dialogue, aimed at audiences interested in close study of the text. Dodds himself regretted this outcome. He felt he had lost sight of an earlier goal, formulated at a time of political turmoil on the eve of WorldWar II, of using the Gorgias to bring out ‘both the resemblance and the difference between Plato’s situation and that of the intellectual today’. The present paper attempts to (...) reconstruct that goal, as it survives residually in his edition, surfaces in his The Greeks and the Irrational, and appears in some writings from the 1930s, particularly in unpublished lectures. Dodds did frequently juxtapose ancient and modern conceptions of the intellectual, and in a way that cast Plato in a positive light, as someone politically engaged and self-critical, and acutely sensitive, as Dodds himself was, to the political implications of social psychology. (shrink)

Die Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre 1794/95 (GWL) ist die erste und einzige von Fichte selbst veröffentlichte Fassung der Wissenschaftslehre und übte großen Einfluss auf ihre philosophiegeschichtliche Rezeption aus. Der Text ist schwer verständlich, denn er war nicht als ein für sich stehendes Werk, sondern als Handschrift für die Zuhörer an der Universität in Jena vorgesehen. Fichte hat ihn neben anderen Texten in einem Semester so schnell redigiert, dass man diese Fassung kaum als eine deutliche Gestaltung der Kerngedanken der Wissenschaftslehre und (...) noch viel weniger als ein vollständiges System derselben betrachten kann. Die neuere Fichte-Forschung hat in den letzten Jahrzehnten größere Aufmerksamkeit auf die neue Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre (die sogenannte Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo), die Sittenlehre, die Rechtslehre sowie ihre jeweiligen späteren Fassungen gerichtet, weil die Zeitgenossen Fichtes die weitgehende Tragweite der Wissenschaftslehre nicht genügend hätten wahrnehmen können. Es mag also beim gegenwärtigen Forschungsstand als altmodisch erscheinen, noch auf die Fassung von 1794/95 zurückzugehen. Die vorliegende Untersuchung tut jedoch eben dies und mit gutem Grund. Denn trotz der vielfältigen wissenschaftlichen Abhandlungen über die GWL bleibt es immer noch dunkel, wie man z. B. den unverhältnismäßig langen und verwirrenden „Abschnitt E“ im zweiten Teil der GWL über die Grundlage des theoretischen Wissens interpretieren und verstehen soll. In der Sekundärliteratur findet man verschiedene Einstellungen, von treuer Wiedergabe über interpretatorische Abschwächung bis hin zur Ermahnung, aber keine hat sich meiner Meinung nach auf den Abschnitt E einen passenden Reim gemacht. (shrink)

Plato's Sophist begins with an attempt to arrive by division at a definition of a Sophist. In the course of the attempt six different descriptions are discussed and the results summarized at 231 c-e. A seventh and final account may be said to occupy the whole of the rest of the dialogue, including the long digression on negative statements. The first five divisions characterize with a considerable amount of satire different types of sophist, or more probably different aspects of (...) the sophistic art. The sixth division is very different. To quote Cornford's words, ‘satire is dropped. The tone is serious and sympathetic, towards the close it becomes eloquent’. (shrink)

These are three welcome works on medieval logic. The Summa Logica of William of Ockham has long been a classic, and scholars have been waiting for this critical edition, begun almost a quarter of a century ago by Philotheus Boehner and finally brought to completion by the combined efforts of Stephen Brown and especially Gedeon Gal, now the general editor of the Opera Philosophica et Theologica being prepared at the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure University. The editors date this work (...) after the Commentary on the Sentences, two volumes of which have already appeared in the above mentioned series. It also postdates Ockham’s commentaries on Porphyry, the Praedicamenta, Perihermenias, and Sophisticis Elenchis, as well as the first four books of Aristotle’s Physics. As a terminus ante quem the editors take the fifth book of this same Physics and see it as certainly prior to the Tractatus de praedestinatione, and to the De corpore Christi and De Sacramento Altaris. Parts of the Quodlibetal questions, however, precede it, and others follow. Loux’s translation, unfortunately, antedated this splendid edition of the Summa Logicae, being based on only the partial, earlier edition of Boehner. Nevertheless, it is a useful instrument providing a good and relatively complete introduction to the basic themes of Ockham’s philosophy of language as well as his ontology. A spot check reveals some misprints, e.g., on pp. 56, 192 and on page 38, lines 68-83 of the Latin edition he used have not been translated. The work is introduced by two essays: "The Ontology of William Ockham" and "Ockham on Generality"—the latter dealing with his theory of supposition. Nuchelmans’ interesting work, though it deals mostly with the medieval history of propositions as bearers of truth and falsity, contains some six chapters which trace the history of the term as early as Plato’s treatment in the Sophist, through Aristotle and the important Stoic lekton and axioma. He also concludes with a useful chapter on the significance of a true propositio, both as a mode of being of a thing and as the mental conception.—A.B.W. (shrink)

In editing Plato's Sophist for the new OCT vol. I, ed. E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, and J. C. G. Strachan , there was less chance of giving novel information about W = Vind. Supp. Gr. 7 for this dialogue than for others in the volume, since Apelt's edition of 1897 was used by Burnet in 1900 and was based on Apelt's own collation of W. The result was better than the (...) somewhat confused information printed by Burnet, even in his 1905 reprint, for W for the other dialogues in vol. I. But in the Sophist as elsewhere in vol. I collations largely due to Dr W. S. M. Nicoll added new facts about all of BDTWP and their correctors, and the search for testimonia largely carried out by Dr E. A. Duke added new facts in that area. A reviewer counts 66 changes in our text of the Sophist, which may perhaps be a slight over-estimate. Classification of changes as substantive or as falling into different groups is sometimes difficult, but I think plausible figures are as follows. We have in 25 places made a different choice of readings from the primary mss. and testimonia. We have printed conjectures where Burnet kept a ms. reading in 17 places, but conversely we have reverted to a ms. reading where Burnet had a conjecture in 8 places. We have printed alternative conjectures to conjectures adopted by Burnet in 6 places. So we have actually departed from the primary sources on at most 9 more occasions overall than Burnet. What must be noted is that Burnet had already printed conjectures on something like 87 occasions , so our percentage addition to Burnet's departures from the primary sources is modest. Moreover Burnet printed about 25 readings from testimonia; we have followed him in 20 or so of these cases, and this in turn implies that the primary mss. are in error at these further 20 places. It needs to be underlined that though Burnet undoubtedly deserved to be regarded as a safe and cautious editor, nevertheless he departed from the primary mss. on average about twice per Stephanus page in this dialogue. Sometimes, of course, testimonia showed him right to do this, but testimonia cover only a quite small part of this dialogue. Otherwise Burnet accepted almost 90 conjectures. For the Politicus the figures are fairly similar; Burnet accepted 22 Byzantine conjectures and 35–40 more modern ones. The new OCT there adds 15 or so more conjectures. (shrink)

Readable translations of Plato's Philebus and Epinomis, from A. E. Taylor's unpublished papers, with the Sophistes and Politicus to follow in a further volume. The long introduction to the Philebus by Taylor amounts to a commentary; it is clear, well-organized, perceptive on the psychological-ethical level, sometimes suggestive on the metaphysical level. Lloyd's introduction to the Epinomis summarizes the problems of its content, and the discussion of its genuineness, with special reference to Taylor's position, sensibly concludes that the question is (...) still moot, depending "on our interpretation of Plato's mind." --C. B. (shrink)

Ryle's recent retirement after almost a half-century of study, teaching and writing might well be regarded as the end of an era. A large segment of the philosophical world has come to regard him as the embodiment of the spirit of Oxford. His clear and informal style, his gift for fresh analogies and striking similes, his mastery of the epigram, have set new literary standards for philosophical writing. Largely responsible for inaugurating the B. Phil. and D. Phil. programs after World (...) War II for the benefit of graduate students from abroad, Ryle both as Waynflete professor of metaphysics and editor of Mind has enormously influenced the thinking of Anglo-American philosophers. Apart from his Concept of Mind, Dilemmas and Plato's Progress, his writings have taken the form of reviews, short articles or essays addressed to specific philosophical issues. Though many of these have become minor classics and have graced innumerable anthologies, it is only now that we have virtually the whole of this important segment of his writings available in book form. With the exception of four essays published originally in French, the papers in these two volumes have been published previously in English, mostly in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Analysis or Mind. They range in time from his early days at Oxford to 1968 and cover a wide range of topics, mainly in the areas of philosophical methodology, the philosophy of logic and the philosophy of mind. Only the fields of moral, political and aesthetic philosophy are comparatively neglected. The first volume contains his critical essays on individual thinkers. They include studies on Plato, Locke and Hume as well as his pieces on such contemporary thinkers as Husserl, Heidegger, Carnap, Wittgenstein, G. E. Moore and John Anderson, who dominated the Australian scene during the first half of this century. The second volume contains 37 pieces dating back to 1929. It is worth mentioning that despite their brevity, Ryle's introductions to these volumes throw considerable light on his philosophical development. While professional philosophers will be happy to have these collected papers in their present form, we hope they will soon become available in less costly editions for student use.--A. B. W. (shrink)

Offering a theory of imagination, and indirectly a defense of the humanities, this overly-rich and confusing work contains more literature than philosophy, and more philosophy than imagination. The author makes many suggestive comparisons: e.g., the literary equivalent of traditional positivism is the novels of Robbe-Grillet; the poetic equivalents of Peirce's firstness, secondness, and thirdness are the poems of Wallace Stevens, Ezra Pound, and T. S. Eliot, respectively. While Levi's division of the imagination into its teleological, dramatic, literary, and metaphysical forms (...) is well taken, he fails to heed Plato's warning to define the essence and not to be satisfied with a list of its kinds. The printing is careless.--A. B. (shrink)

We describe in some detail how to build an infinite computing machine within a continuous Newtonian universe. The relevance of our construction to the Church-Turing thesis and the Platonist-Intuitionist debate about the nature of mathematics is also discussed.

In the "cratylus", Plato presents two theories about the correctness of names, I.E., Names are correct by nature and names are correct by convention. In this paper, I argue that plato holds both views because he recognizes that the word 'name' is ambiguous as between type and token. Name tokens (individual strings of marks and noises) are conventional for plato. But name types (the role played by the tokens or the concept expressed by the tokens) are not (...) conventional for plato. (shrink)

This book, splendidly produced by Messrs. Nelson, comes to us from beyond the tomb. The great platonist whose text it is died in 1945. The present work is a first selection from a set of unpublished papers by him, which were deposited in Edinburgh University Library after his death. These papers are mainly translations and studies of the later Platonic dialogues, commencing with the Theaetetus. They represent the author’s labours in the years 1933-4, following the publication of his ‘magnum opus’, (...) Plato, the Man and his Work and of his translations of Timaeus and Critias ; Parmenides and Laws. The author’s own intention had been to publish the translations of the Sophistes, Politicus and Philebus together. The editor and publishers have in this edition decided to bring out the Philebus and Epinomis in one volume, leaving the Sophistes and Politicus for later publication. The long introduction to the Philebus is from the pen of A. E. Taylor himself; the introduction to the Epinomis has been supplied by A. C. Lloyd. (shrink)

The editors tell us this book is an outgrowth of their course in philosophical arguments. It contains both readings from traditional sources, and new material especially for this book. It is thus of interest as a potential text, as a source book, and for its original contributions. To consider it first as a text, it would be a challenging and valuable choice for sophisticated students. As a source-book, it is a good anthology of hard-core arguments on seven metaphysical topics. Authors (...) selected include Aristotle, Plato, Church Fathers, Rationalists, Locke and Hume, Bradley and Moore, Kant, Frege, Carnap, C. I. Lewis, Russell, and others. Selections run from a page or two to 16-page Hume excerpts. The last section, on The Nature of Metaphysics, contains essays newly written for this volume by A. J. Ayer, Brand Blanshard, John Passmore, and M. Lazerowitz. Other new material elsewhere in the book includes Alice Ambrose on Wittgenstein, and the introduction by W. E. Kennick. The latter suggests that in metaphysics there are arguments but no proofs, and that metaphysics has four curious characteristics: its disputes are never resolved; in these disputes the array of experts on each side is likely to be equally impressive; antinomies seem unavoidable; and metaphysics frequently conflicts with common sense. Ayer's article is called "Metaphysics and Common Sense." Using Carnap's distinction of "internal" and "external" questions, he finds metaphysical questions to be external. His explanation of what these are and why anyone would wish to raise them yields three legitimate ways in which metaphysics can add to our understanding of the world, and concludes that "it would be a mistake to forego the more imaginative kinds of conceptual exploration." In both tone and content this essay is a surprise for readers who know earlier work by Ayer. Passmore attempts to correct the popular tendency to confuse the philosopher with the sage. He places metaphysics, mathematics, and empirical science within "rational discussion": each is speculation, each has its characteristic control procedure. Blanshard's article attempts to defend metaphysics against criticisms such as those made by Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Freud. Lazerowitz treats the thesis that "metaphysics works by unseen paradoxes."--M. B. M. (shrink)

The ideas and methods of cybernetics are increasingly penetrating the biological and medical sciences, and today we are justified in speaking of a new branch of science: biological and medical cybernetics. This branch already has a number of important and encouraging subfields.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A "Conception" of Truth in Plato's SophistBlake E. Hestir (bio)1. IntroductionPlato's solution to the problem of falsehood carries a notorious reputation which sometimes overshadows a variety of interesting developments in Plato's philosophy. One of the less-noted developments in the Sophist is a nascent conception of truth which casts truth as a particular relation between language and the world. F. M. Cornford, for one, in his translation and (...) commentary on the Sophist takes Plato's account of truth to involve something like correspondence: "The [true] statement as a whole is complex and its structure corresponds to the structure of the fact. Truth means this correspondence."1 In more general contexts, we find A. N. Prior claiming in his Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the correspondence theory of truth: "Aristotle did not originate the correspondence theory but took it over from Plato's Sophist."2However, all this assumes a lot about Plato, much less Aristotle. For one, it assumes that to claim that the statement 'Theaetetus is sitting' is true is to claim that it is true because it corresponds with the fact that Theaetetus is sitting. Other scholars, for a wide variety of interpretational reasons, have been reluctant to accept Cornford's view, but few offer any explanation of what sort of account of truth we might ascribe to Plato by the end of the Sophist. Michael Frede claims [End Page 1] that Plato thinks a true statement is true precisely if a form is something that is with reference to a subject. Frede is quiet about whether this expresses a particular conception of truth, but if he's right, truth involves something other than correspondence. Alfred Tarski has argued at length that truth is a simpler notion than that of correspondence or coherence or whatever. In fact, one claim he emphasizes about his own "conception" of truth is that it is similar to the classical conception of truth we find in places like Aristotle's Metaphysics—a conception of truth which is formulated in Greek in very much the same way Plato formulates it in the Sophist. Unfortunately, Tarski never sufficiently explains exactly what it is about the classical conception that makes it closer to his own.I shall argue that in a very general sense Tarski is right about the ancient conception of truth, but this is not to claim that Tarski's own conception of truth can be found in Plato. By interpreting in a certain way Plato's solution to the paradox of not being and his solution to the problem of falsehood, I argue that the account of true and false statement that emerges within the discussion of not being and falsehood generally neither entails nor outwardly suggests any of the traditional characterizations of a correspondence "theory" of truth.3 On the contrary, what emerges from the Sophist is a very minimalistic "conception" of truth which requires neither positing the existence of facts or states of affairs nor formulating a precise, explanatory definition of truth. Aristotle's discussion of truth in the Categories and De Interpretatione is in many respects remarkably similar to Plato's; and I argue that although some, including W. D. Ross and J. L. Ackrill, have found forms of the correspondence theory in these early works, Aristotle's conception of truth makes no radical departures from Plato's and in fact stands as an obvious extension of the ideas about truth Plato presents in the Sophist. In the final section, I offer a few reasons why one should not expect to find the emergence of a "theory" of truth in the Sophist. If my general interpretation of Plato is correct, we should revise at least one historically significant footnote to Plato accordingly: Plato did not father the correspondence theory of truth and those claiming otherwise risk anachronistically attributing a problem-laden theory to Plato and/or missing one of Plato's points about the fundamental nature of truth.2. The Target Passage: Sophist 2 6 3 B 4Interesting philosophical developments in Plato's dialogues are frequently obscured by vexing translational issues, and the Sophist certainly contains a few. In fact, Plato's account... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 475 whereas in some texts Aquinas explicitly teaches that the higher senses of vision and hearing are the ones that mainly (praecipue, principaliter) lead to aesthetic experience.t5 Moreover, the statement that only in the thirteenth century was the question of the distinction between the higher and lower senses explicitly raised (p. l13f.), is true only if the author meant to exclude the pre-medieval or patristic as well (...) as the ancient period of philosophy.16 Finally, there is one technical weakness in this book that cannot be left unmentioned. The overwhelming majority of references are not to the original medieval texts treated and/or quoted in the three-volume edition, but to the number of volume and page in that edition. Thus the reader must be both familiar with French and in possession of the original three-volume work, or remain hopelessly frustrated every time he wishes to consult the original texts or at least know which texts are being mentioned. Yet, if one knows French, he does not need the English translation; and if he is also fortunate enough to have access to the original three-volume version, he will not need the abridged version of the original work at all. For this reason, should there be a second edition of this translation, the references should be changed from the l~tudes to the original medieval works. Although the negative remarks are more lengthy in this review than the positive evaluation is, it would be a grave mistake to conclude from this that the defects outweigh the value of the book. As a matter of fact, upon finishing the reading of this translation of De Bruyne's work, this reviewer was left with the conviction that, in the final balance, the reader can only greatly benefit from this work, and we all owe gratitude to the translator for having made this highly informative work available in the English language. FRANCIS J. KOVACH University of Oklahoma 1~ Summ. theol. I-II,27,1,ad 3; In Psalm. 44,2. ~6 Cf. Plato, Hipp. maL 298 A; Gorg. 474 D; Leg. XII, 961 D; Aristotle, De an. III,3, 429a 3; Augustine, De lib. arb. II,7, 16-19; 14,38; De ord. II,ll, etc. Le origini del metodo analitico: il Cinquecento. By Angelo Crescini. (Udine: Del Bianco, 1965. Published by the Istituto di Filosofia, Facnlt~ di Lettere e Filosofia of the Universit~ degli Studi di Trieste. Pp. 340. L 5,000) Professor Crescini has certainly picked a topic of great interest upon which to write. Recent students of Renaissance logic such as N. W. Gilbert, V. Mufioz Delgado, W. Ong, G. Papuli, W. Risse, and C. Vasoli have pointed out the vitality and significance associated with the development of the logical thought of the period. The general question of methodology has produced an enormous scholarly literature in recent years,I but much remains to be done before we fully understand how various methodologies have evolved and what relation philosophical discussions of method have had to the actual practice of science. Therefore, it would be most desirable to have a 1 For further information see Laurens Laudan, "Theories of Scientific Method from Plato to Mach: A Bibliographical Review," History of Science 7 (1968), 1-63. 476 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY detailed, comprehensive, and accurate study of the evolution of analytic method during the sixteenth century, particularly in view of the significance taken on by such a methodology with the 'rise of modern science'. With such a background in view the reviewer comes to this volume in anticipation of being generally enlightened on various matters. Unfortunately, Crescini's book is on the whole disappointing, although nearly everyone will find the odd bit of information of which he was not previously aware. It definitely does not, however, establish a solid foundation for later studies. The book is organized into three principal parts, dealing with the development of the analytic method in logic (pp. 21-188), in the natural sciences (pp. 189-284), and in mathematics (vv. 285-328). The first section treats discussions of the topic among writers on logical subject, under which heading are included 'humanist' logicians such as... (shrink)

We discuss the philosophical status of the statement that (9n – 1) is divisible by 8 for various sizes of the number n. We argue that even this simple problem reveals deep tensions between truth and verification. Using Gillies's empiricist classification of theories into levels, we propose that statements in arithmetic should be classified into three different levels depending on the sizes of the numbers involved. We conclude by discussing the relationship between the real number system and the physical continuum.

"Anyone interested in Simone Weil will want, and need, to read this superb collection." —Diogenes Allen, Princeton Theological Seminary “These essays—some written by leading specialists in Simone Weil's thought, others by prominent theologians and philosophers of religion—are especially valuable not only for elucidating Weil's reading of Plato but also for showing what one or another form of Christian Platonism can mean for us today.” —James A. Wiseman, O.S.B., Catholic University of America "This remarkable and penetrating collection of essays on (...) Simone Weil's religious philosophy illumines the living intersection between serious metaphysics and ethics. The authors carefully examine this relation that much post-modern reflection has until now only skimmed, but that Weil herself managed to embrace with breathtaking intellectual discipline and self-giving. The book is a bracing testimony to the deep moral consequences of classical ontology and its challenging Christian reorientation." —The Rev. Dr. Ephraim Radner, Ascension Episcopal Church, Pueblo, Colorado In this book a group of renowned international scholars seek to discern the ways in which Simone Weil was indebted to Plato, and how her provocative readings of his work offer challenges to contemporary philosophy, theology, and spirituality. This is the first book in twenty years to systematically investigate Weil’s Christian Platonism. (shrink)